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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The defendant, Melva Garcia (hereinafter "Garcia"), adopts plaintiffs' 
recitation of the parties below and on appeal. 
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JURISDICTION 
Garcia adopts the plaintiffs' jurisdictional statement. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
A. Did the trial court properly rule that Melva Garcia, an out-of-state 
landlord of commercial property, did not have a duty to call her long-term tenants 
to determine whether they had turned an electrical power switch off?1 This issue 
is reviewed under the "correctness" standard. Trujillo v. Jenkins, 840 P.2d 777 
(Utah 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES OR 
RULES, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(a)(5); (7); and (9). 
(5) A Statement of the Issues. This statement, presented for review, 
including for each issue; the standard of appellate review with supporting 
authority; . . . 
(7) A Statement of the Case. This statement shall first indicate briefly 
the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court 
1 Plaintiffs claim to have preserved this issue on appeal at R. 1923. This 
page references the "Answer of defendant Heron Industries to Amended 
Complaint." This early pleading cannot preserve plaintiffs' claim against Garcia 
and therefore the lower court's ruling should be affirmed. 
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below. A Statement of Facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall 
follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be 
supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(9) An Argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and 
reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds 
for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact 
finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW. 
The defendant, Melva Garcia, is an elderly woman who owns 436 
Main, a commercial property located on Main Street in Park City, Utah. Her long 
time commercial tenants, Dion and Kerry Hale, operated a business they named 
"Quality Interiors." During the period of time relevant to this case, Melva Garcia 
lived in Sun City, Arizona, a retirement center. 
In the winter months of 1990, Garcia's tenants complained of water 
leaking in the rear portion of 436 Main. In response, Garcia retained independent 
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contractors to evaluate the problem and make necessary repairs. Those 
contractors, Deseret Moon Roofing and Alpine Electric, installed heat cable on the 
roof as well as a separate electrical outlet and power switch for the heat cable. 
The heat cable was to control ice build-up on the roof. 
Garcia was given no written instructions regarding the operation of 
the heat cable by either of the contractors, but was simply told to turn the power 
switch on and off as the ice build-up necessitated. Kerry Hale received and 
understood these instructions and took upon himself the personal responsibility of 
managing the heat cable operation. In fact, he did not tell his mother, Dion Hale, 
or any of his employees about the power switch because he wanted to be "solely 
responsible" for turning the switch on and off. He understood how the switch 
worked and understood that the switch should be turned off during the summer 
months. Mr. Hale further testified that he did not expect or anticipate that Garcia 
would turn the power switch on or off, in that he felt it was his own responsibility 
and knew that Melva Garcia was an out-of-state landlord. In June of 1993 a fire 
originated somewhere in the 436 Main structure. That fire damaged both 436 
Main and 438 Main. 
The claim against Melva Garcia is that she had a duty to "ensure that 
the cable's toggle switch was off." A bench trial against Garcia, and others, 
commenced on May 22, 2000 before the Honorable Judge Thome, and at the end 
of plaintiffs' case in chief, Judge Thorne granted Garcia's Motion for Non-Suit or 
Involuntary Dismissal under Rule 41(b), finding that, "plaintiffs failed to establish 
a duty on the part of Garcia to call her tenants to remind them to turn off the roof 
deicing cable when it was not needed." (R.6672). It is from that ruling that the 
plaintiffs appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are taken from the Findings of Fact entered by 
Judge Thome on June 29, 2000. 
1. In or about September of 1991, Melva Garcia retained 
Deseret/Moon Roofing, a licensed Utah roofing contractor, to purchase and install 
a roof deicing cable at the rear of her building located at 436 Main Street in Park 
City, Summit County, State of Utah. (R.6668). 
2. Deseret/Moon Roofing was responsible for selecting and 
purchasing an appropriate deicing cable and related equipment, and installing that 
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equipment at 436 Main. Deseret/Moon Roofing purchase and installed an 
"ADKS" model of the roof deicing cable. (R.6668). 
3. At about the same time, Garcia retained Alpine Electric, a 
licensed Utah electrical contracting firm, to install electrical service and related 
equipment dedicated to the use of the roof deicing cable. Alpine Electric was 
responsible for selecting the appropriate equipment and installing it at 436 Main. 
(R.6668). 
4. Garcia's tenant at 436 Main, Quality Interiors, through its duly 
authorized representative, Kerry Hale, thereafter agreed to be responsible for 
operation and maintenance of the roof deicing cable. Quality Interiors knew that 
the cable was not to be energized except at appropriate times when ice and snow 
were melting on the roof. Quality Interiors did not expect Garcia to turn the cable 
on and off, nor did it expect Garcia to call to remind them to turn the cable on and 
off. (R.6668). 
5. In the early morning hours of June 15, 1993, a fire was reported 
at 436 Main. Plaintiffs' allege this fire originated at and was caused by the Easy 
Heat and Heron Cable's ADKS model roof deicing cable. (R.6669). 
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6. The fire caused substantial damage to both 436 Main and 438 
Main. (R.6669). 
7. Garcia retained licensed professionals to select appropriate 
equipment for installation at 436 Main, to install the equipment together with any 
additional safety features the professionals deemed appropriate, and to install 
electrical service dedicated to the ADKS cable together with any additional safety 
equipment such professionals deemed necessary. (R.6671). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PRESERVE ANY ISSUE FOR APPEAL 
AGAINST MELVA GARCIA. 
Utah law is clear in stating that an appellant must first give the trial 
court the opportunity to correct any mistakes brought to its attention. This must be 
done in the Motion for a New Trial and in the Objections to the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. Plaintiffs did not mention the name of Garcia in its 
Motion for a New Trial, nor did they address Garcia's alleged duty to turn off the 
cable in their Objections to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
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Accordingly, plaintiffs have waived any issue on appeal they may have had 
against Melva Garcia. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF DOES NOT COMPLY WITH UTAH R. APP. P. 
24(A)(5); (7); (9), AND THEREFORE THE COURT SHOULD ASSUME 
THE CORRECTNESS OF 
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGEMENT. 
Plaintiffs' brief does not comply with appellate procedure in three 
critical respects. First, the plaintiffs did not include a standard of appellate review 
as required under 24(a)(5). Second, plaintiffs did not present the court with a 
single fact required by 24(a)(7) relevant to their claim that Melva Garcia owed a 
duty of care to ensure the cable's toggle switch was off. Third, plaintiffs entirely 
ignored Rule 24(a)(9) by: (1) failing to cite a single legal authority (or for that 
matter, authority of any kind) relied upon; (2) failing to provide the court with any 
legal analysis supporting its claim of error; and, (3) failing to marshal a single fact 
that supports the challenged finding. As a result of plaintiffs' failure to brief the 
argument adequately against Garcia, the plaintiffs have required this court to 
assume the plaintiffs' burden of argument and research. This court has 
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consistently refused to do so and should therefore decline to review plaintiffs' 
claims against Garcia. 
POINT III 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT 
GARCIA HAD A DUTY TO CALL HER TENANTS TO "ENSURE THE 
CABLE'S TOGGLE SWITCH WAS OFF." 
At trial, plaintiffs proffered testimony from Melva Garcia, Kerry Hale 
and Dion Hale. Garcia proffered additional testimony from herself, and Kerry and 
Dion Hale. Even without the proffered testimony from Garcia, plaintiffs failed to 
establish a legal duty owed by Garcia. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PRESERVE ANY ISSUE ON APPEAL 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT, MELVA GARCIA. 
Utah law is clear that prior to asking an appellate court to reverse a 
trial court, the appellant must first have brought the alleged error to the attention 
of the trial court and there been denied relief. See E.G. Brookside Mobile Home 
Park v. Peebles, 43 P.3d 968, 972 (Utah 2002) "[I]n order to preserve any issue 
for appeal, the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial 
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court has an opportuiiity to rule on the issue." Id Accord Badger v. Brooklyn 
Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). 
Plaintiffs made no mention whatsoever of the defendant Garcia in 
their Motion for a New Trial. (R. 7032 - 7050). Similarly, plaintiffs did not 
dispute any Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law regarding defendant Garcia's 
specific duty to turn off the heat cable in its Objections to Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. (R. 6468 - 6472). 
Having failed to bring to the trial court's attention the alleged errors 
with respect to Garcia, the trial court never had the opportunity to rule on the 
issue, therefore the plaintiffs have waived their claims against Garcia. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF FAILED TO COMPLY MATERIALLY WITH UTAH 
R. APP. P. 24(a)(5); (7); AND (9) AND THEREFORE THE COURT 
SHOULD DECLINE TO ADDRESS THE GARCIA ISSUE ON APPEAL. 
While minor failures to comply with Rule 24 have not been found to 
be fatal by this court, this court has consistently held that "when the overall 
analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument 
to the reviewing cour t . . . . [the court is] justified in declining to address it." State 
v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). The plaintiffs' brief did not set out a 
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standard of appellate review for the issue against Garcia as required by Rule 
24(a)(7). While this appears to be a minor departure from the rules, it is followed 
closely by three critical departures. 
Rule 24(a)(7) states: 
A Statement of the Case. The statement shall first 
indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of 
proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A 
statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented 
for review shall follow. A statement of facts and 
references to the proceedings below shall be supported 
by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph 
(e) of this rule. (Emphasis added). 
Plaintiffs' statement of the case does not include a single fact that 
relates to their issue regarding Melva Garcia. It is not that they presented the court 
with "insufficient facts" relevant to Melva Garcia; it is that they presented the 
court with no facts at all relevant to Melva Garcia. 
To compound this deficiency, the plaintiffs then failed to comply with 
Rule 24(a)(9) which requires the following: 
(9) An Argument. The argument shall contain the 
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to 
the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing 
any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to 
the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. 
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A party challenging a fact finding must first marshall all 
record evidence that supports the challenged finding. 
To begin, plaintiffs' brief does not provide this court with any legal 
authority supporting its claim against Garcia. Second, plaintiffs' brief provides no 
analysis to guide the court in determining the validity of the plaintiffs' claim. This 
court has stated that: 
Implicitly Rule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to 
authority, but development of that authority and reasoned 
analysis based on that authority. We have previously 
stated that this court is not a depository in which the 
appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research. 
Id. (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988). 
Plaintiffs' brief did not contain even a "bald citation to authority" let 
alone develop that authority through reasoned analysis. Plaintiffs' brief includes 
only one sentence of argument relating to Melva Garcia, a sentence devoid of case 
authority or legal analysis. 
Finally, plaintiffs' one sentence of argument regarding the defendant 
Garcia suggests that plaintiffs established that Garcia "improperly" delegated her 
responsibility to tenants. Plaintiffs cite to evidence proffered by Garcia at trial 
wherein Kerry Hale admitted he was told how to operate the heat cable and that he 
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did not tell his mother or employees about the operation of the heat cable because 
he "wanted to be responsible for it." (R. 6115). There is no evidence at R.6115 
that even suggests that Melva Garcia did anything "improperly." 
In order to attack factual findings successfully, "an appellant must 
marshal the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that, despite 
this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against 
the clear weight of evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous." In Re: Estate 
ofBartelU 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989), (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 
193 (Utah 1987)). "If the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate 
court assumes that the record supports the findings of the trial court." Saunders v. 
Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). 
Garcia proffered factual evidence by way of deposition testimony 
from Dion Hale, Kerry Hale and Melva Garcia. These proffers each contain facts 
that support the challenged findings, yet plaintiffs did not marshal one of them. 
Because plaintiffs failed to marshal evidence supporting the trial court's Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, this court must assume that the record supports 
the findings of the trial court. 
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When this court has found that an appellant has briefed an issue so 
inadequately that it shifts the burden of research and argument to the reviewing 
court, this court has declined to address that issue. In State v. Thomas, this court 
reviewed a Court of Appeals ruling wherein the Court of Appeals would not 
address one of the appellant's issues because it was inadequately briefed. This 
court found: 
While failure to cite to pertinent authority may not 
always render an issue inadequately briefed, it does so 
when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to 
shift the burden of research and argument to the 
reviewing court. Because of [defendant] Thomas's lack 
of analysis, the photo array issue was inadequately 
briefed and the Court of Appeals was justified in 
declining to address it. 
State v. Thomas at 305. 
This court has been consistent in refusing to consider issues not 
adequately briefed.2 Because plaintiffs' brief contains no facts, no legal authority, 
no legal analysis and no marshaled facts supporting the challenged findings, this 
2 See Walker v. U.S. Gen., Inc., 916 P.2d 903, 908 (Utah 1996); Butler, 
Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225, 
234 (Utah 1995); State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 996 (Utah 1989); Graco 
Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc. v. Ironwood Exploration, Inc., 766 P.2d 1074, 1079 
(Utah 1988); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). 
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court should do what it has consistently warned appellants that it would do when a 
brief substantially failed to comply with Rule 24, and that is, to decline to address 
that issue. 
POINT III 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT 
GARCIA HAD A DUTY TO "ENSURE THE CABLE'S TOGGLE SWITCH 
WAS OFF." 
It was established at trial (See Garcia's Statement of the Case and 
Statement of the Facts) that Melva Garcia was an out-of-state landlord of the 436 
Main property. Her tenants, Dion and Kerry Hale, had complete control over the 
leased property. In the course of having the heat cable installed on the back of 436 
Main, Kerry Hale became aware of its purpose and its operation. He 
unequivocally stated in sworn testimony that the operation of the cable was very 
simple and that he wanted to be responsible for the operation of the heat cable. He 
did not tell his Mother (Dion Hale) about the toggle switch that operates the cable 
because he did not want her "messing with it." For the same reason, he did not tell 
any of his employees about the toggle switch. Mr. Hale's testimony can be 
summarized by a series of five questions he was asked late in his deposition. They 










Did you understand, then, that this switch powered 
the heat cable? 
Yes. 
Did you understand that this cable was only to be 
operated when it needed to melt ice or snow on the 
roof? 
Yes. 
That at any other time, it should be in the off 
position? 
Yes. 
You did not expect Melva Garcia to come and turn 
the switch off for you? 
No. 
In fact, you knew that she wasn't even in Utah in 
the winter months? 
Yes. 
(R. 6116). 
Garcia put the heat cable on the roof through independent contractors 
in response to the Hale's request that she do something about the roofs leaking 
due to ice and snow build-up. Plaintiffs claim, without legal authority, that Garcia 
"improperly delegated her responsibilities to tenants." In essence, plaintiffs want 
Garcia to be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of her tenants. Plaintiffs 
never supplied the trial court (or this court) with any legal authority to support that 
assertion. Garcia, on the other hand, did supply the Court with legal authority 
which states that a landlord who is not in possession of the leased premises cannot 
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be held liable to third persons for damages resulting from tenants' negligent use of 
the premises. (See Ragsdale v. Harris, 293 S.E.2d 475 (Ga. App. 1982) (landlord 
who parts fully with possession and right of possession cannot be held liable to 
third persons for damages resulting from tenants' negligent or illegal use of the 
premises); Forester v. R.L.M., Inc., 397 N.E.2d 427 (Ohio App. 1978) (landlord 
out-of-possession is not liable to persons injured as a result of tenants' acts or 
failures); Borders v. Roseberry, 532 P.2d 1366 (Kan. 1975) (landlord/tenant 
relationship is not sufficient to make landlord liable for acts of tenants); Filipczak 
v. International, 195 N.W.2d 433 (Minn. 1972) (where landlord retains no control 
over land leased to tenants, landlord is not liable for tenants' negligence in 
maintaining the premises). (R. 6108). 
Plaintiffs failed to establish any right of possession on the part of 
Garcia and further failed to establish any factual basis for a duty on the part of 
Garcia to call her tenants and inquire whether they had turned certain utilities or 
appliances on or off. That duty would assumably require a landlord to call to 
ensure that a toaster, iron, curling iron, coffee maker, etc. were all turned off. 
Such a duty simply does not exist. There is no dispute that Garcia's tenants knew 
of the heat cable, since it was put there at their request and Kerry Hale assumed 
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responsibility for operation of the heat cable and operated it successfully from the 
time it was installed in 1991 through June of 1993. 
Finally, the plaintiffs suggest at footnote 9 of their brief that as long 
as they made a "prima facie case that the cable started the fire, Melva Garcia 
should still be a party to the case." Again, the plaintiffs supply no legal authority 
or analysis for this statement. It is of no consequence whether the court was in 
error in its ruling on whether the cable caused the fire. The court ruled that Garcia 
did not have a duty to call to ensure that the toggle switch to the heat cable had 
been turned off. As a result, Melva Garcia was dismissed from the case regardless 
of the court's findings on the cause of the fire. Therefore, regardless of what this 
court does with the issue of fire cause and origin, Melva Garcia was not 
vicariously responsible for the conduct of her tenants because she had no duty to 
constantly monitor, by telephone, the status of the toggle switch for the heat cable. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs' brief fails to adequately address the Melva Garcia issue. 
Plaintiffs' brief contains no facts relevant to Melva Garcia. Plaintiffs' brief 
contains no legal authority or legal analysis relating to the issue involving Garcia. 
Further, plaintiffs marshal no facts supporting the court's ruling. As a result, this 
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court should decline to address the Garcia issue and assume the correctness of the 
Judgement below. 
In the alternative, plaintiffs have failed to cite a single fact or legal 
authority supporting their claim that Melva Garcia is vicariously liable for the acts 
of her tenants. Garcia has cited facts and legal authority to the contrary. 
Therefore, this court should affirm the lower court's ruling with respect to Melva 
Garcia. 
DATE Dthis / / day of March, 2003. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
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